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We investigate empirically the effect of government purchases on unemployment in 20 
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During the nancial crisis, most OECD countries used scal measures extensively
to stimulate the economy. More recently, increasing public debt and rising default
premia on sovereign debt lead to substantial scal tightening in many countries.
At the same time, unemployment has soared in many OECD countries. The large
changes in policy and unemployment rates raise the question of how scal policy
aects unemployment, irrespective of what the motivation for the policy is. This
paper explores the eect of a change in government purchases on goods and services
on aggregate unemployment.
The eect of scal policy on the economy has been subject to considerable in-
terest in the recent years, cf. surveys in Auerbach et al. (2010), Perotti (2007),
Beetsma and Giuliodori (2010), and Hall (2009). The bulk of this literature has
dealt with the eect of scal policy on GDP, while the literature exploring the eect
on unemployment is much more limited. Most studies conclude that an increase in
government purchases leads to lower unemployment (e.g. Monacelli et al. (2010)
and IMF (2010)), but there are also studies like Br uckner and Pappa (2010) which
nd that increased government purchases lead to higher unemployment.
Our study diers from most of the previous studies along several dimensions.
First, we use an extensive panel data set for 20 OECD countries for the period 1960-
2007, which makes it possible to explore whether the eect of scal policy depends
on a host of other factors, like the cyclical situation of the economy, the openness
of the economy, the type of scal impulse, etc. A number of recent papers argue
that the eect of scal policy depends crucially on the possible monetary response
(e.g.Coenen et al. (2010) and Hall (2009)); we explore this idea by considering how
the eect diers across monetary regimes. Second, we draw upon a large literature,
associated with among others Layard et al. (1991) and Nickell et al. (2005), which
has documented the importance of labour market institutions for the evolution of
the rate of unemployment. Our analysis builds on this literature, investigating the
eect of scal policy in a regression framework, controlling for other explanatory
variables, including institutions in the labour market. This also allows us to explore
whether the eect of scal policy depends on labour market institutions (which we
nd that it does).
We nd that an increase in government purchases leads to an economically and
statistically signicant reduction in unemployment. The point estimate in our xed
eects equation implies that a permanent increase in government purchases equal
to one percent of GDP leads to a reduction in unemployment of 0:25 percentage
points after one year. The IV estimate is considerably larger, with a reduction in
unemployment of about 0:60 percentage points after one year. In either case the
eect decreases gradually, and only about 1/5 remains after ten years. The size of
the eect is highly dependent on other factors in the economy. For example, we
nd that the reduction in unemployment due to a rise in government purchases is
greater when the economy is in a weak cyclical situation. Furthermore, in line with
the Mundell-Fleming model, we nd a strong eect of scal policy on unemployment
in countries with a xed exchange rate, but no eect for countries with a oating
exchange rate. This is consistent with recent research mentioned above, arguing
that scal policy may have a strong impact on the economy in situations when the
monetary policy is constrained (see e.g. Coenen et al. (2010)).
The rest of the paper is organized as follow. Section 2 provides a brief review
2of the theoretical and empirical literature on the eect of scal policy on GDP and
unemployment. In section 3, we present our empirical approach, while the empirical
results are laid out in section 4. Section 5 concludes. The appendices describe data
and additional results.
2 The eect of scal policy on unemployment - a
comparison with the literature
Most of the the literature on the eect of scal policy focuses on the eect on
GDP, see surveys referred to above. While there is large variation in the ndings,
most studies nd that increased government spending has a positive impact on
GDP, even if the size of the eect may vary considerably depending on the specic
circumstances. The eect on unemployment is clearly linked to the eect on GDP,
as one would expect an increase in output to be associated with higher employment.
However, as scal policy is also likely to aect labour supply, there is an additional
channel for the eect. In this brief review we will concentrate on the eect on
unemployment to save space; however, in the discussion of the empirical results
below, we will also compare with related studies focussing on the eect on GDP.
An early study is Holmlund and Linden (1993), who explore the eects of public
employment in a calibrated search model. They nd ambiguous eects on unemploy-
ment, as increased wage pressure may counteract the direct unemployment-reducing
eect of increased public employment. More recently, Monacelli et al. (2010) explore
the eect of government consumption in a neoclassical model augmented with search
and matching frictions. They show that while higher government consumption in-
creases the hiring rate due to the negative wealth eect inducing higher labour
supply, this eect is dampened by the rise in the real interest rate. Overall, the
eect of an increase in government spending equal to one percent of GDP leads to
a reduction in the rate of unemployment of 0:2 percentage points, i.e. a fairly small
reduction in unemployment. However, in their empirical study, which is a structural
VAR analysis on US data, they nd a larger eect of 0:6 percentage points. Pappa
(2009) and Linnemann (2009) also nd that increased public employment leads to
increased total employment. In contrast, Br uckner and Pappa (2010), in an analysis
of 10 OECD countries using structural VARs, nd that higher government expendi-
tures increases the unemployment rate. However, Br uckner and Pappa (2010) also
nd that increased government spending leads to higher GDP and higher employ-
ment, so that the increase in unemployment is caused by higher participation rates
due to increased labour supply. Gomes (2010) nds mixed eects of scal shocks on
unemployment in a DSGE model with search and matching frictions.
An important methodological problem in an analysis of the eects of scal policy
is that the policy potentially is endogenous, in the sense that the key indicators of
scal policy clearly depend on the state of the economy. In the literature, this
is typically handled either by focussing on the eect of specic events that can
be thought to be exogenous, such as changes in military spending in a response
to political changes (e.g. Ramey and Shapiro (1999) and Eichenbaum and Fisher
(2005)), or by use of a structural vector autoregression (SVAR) model, where the
model explains several macroeconomic variables by their lags and exogenous shocks
to the variables in the model, see e.g. Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Fat as and Mihov
(2001), Benetrix and Lane (2010), Beetsma and Giuliodori (2010) and Monacelli
3et al. (2010). Both these methods have clear advantages when it comes to dealing
with endogenity. However, the methods also have their weaknesses, see Monacelli
et al. (2010) and Auerbach et al. (2010). For the specic events approach, it may
be asked whether these events also aect the economy directly, implying that one
does not detect the true eect of the policy. For the SVAR approach, there are
concerns whether the scal shocks identied in the analysis might be anticipated
by the private sector in advance, which would cause problems in the interpretation.
Furthermore, within the SVAR approach it is also dicult to explore whether the
eect depends on the cyclical situation of the economy, as would be expected from
traditional keynesian arguments. More recently, a number of studies analyze the
eect of scal policy within structural models used for macro policymaking, typically
of the Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) type, see e.g. Coenen
et al. (2010); however, the ndings in these studies hinge on whether the model
is appropriate, which is a matter that is still open for discussion, cf. e.g. Chari
et al. (2009) and Caballero (2010). This is a clear argument for also trying other
approaches.
We consider the eect of a change in government purchases on unemployment,
building on a panel data estimation framework derived by Nymoen and Sparrman
(2010). More specically, we add the real change in government purchases, measured
as a share of trend-GDP, to an empirical equation for aggregate unemployment as
a function of a number of labour market institutions. This approach has several
advantages. First, an extensive literature has shown that aggregate unemployment
to a large extent is determined by labour market institutions, see e.g. Layard et al.
(1991) and Nickell et al. (2005). Thus, it seems appropriate to control for the eect
of labour market variables when analysing the eect of scal policy. Second, with
a data set covering 20 countries and 47 years, there is large variation in a number
of key variables, making it possible to explore how the eect of scal policy may
vary depending on for instance the monetary regime, the openness of the economy,
or the size of the public debt.
We restrict attention to the eect of government purchases, that is, government
consumption and investment, which includes public employment but excludes trans-
fers, which makes the endogeneity problems less compelling than if we had analysed
the eect of changes in taxes and transfers. Tax revenues and expenditures on trans-
fers are clearly endogenous, following changes in the economy according to rules and
legislation. For example, all \passive" unemployment expenditure like benets, and
the large majority of active unemployment related expenditure, are classied as
transfers, not government purchases, and thus not included in our analysis. In con-
trast, government purchases are not directly linked to the state of the economy.
Clearly, the state of the economy also aects purchase decisions, but also other
factors come into play, like electoral cycles, party politics, lobbyism and pressure
groups, media attention, etc. Furthermore, a large part of government purchases
may be subject to a lengthy bureaucratic process involving both the decision making
and the implementation, implying that there is no clear cut or simple relationship
between the state of the economy and government purchases. Yet there is of course
a potential endogeneity problem: When we include the change in government pur-
chases as a regressor in the estimated equation, any correlation between our scal
variable and the error term in the equation may bias our estimate.
We address this problem in two ways. First, we use instrumental variable esti-
4mation, where we treat the measure of scal policy as endogenous. The instruments
we use, which are past values of the change in government purchases and past values
of government debt, seem to pass the most basic tests.
Second, we use an omitted variables approach. The idea here is that scal policy
might be correlated with the error term because it is aected by other explanatory
variables that also aect unemployment. By including the omitted variable, the
potential bias will be reduced or removed, cf. discussion below.
From a theoretical perspective, one would expect the eect of an increase in
government spending to depend on whether it is decit-nanced or debt-nanced.
However, to distinguish between these two alternatives one must be able to dier-
entiate between tax changes induced by changes in the economy and tax changes
linked to the nancing of public expenditure. Given the identication problems
that are involved, we have chosen not to do this at this stage. Thus, our results
must be interpreted as an average eect, where the weights depend on the average
method of nancing over the sample period. As government debt has increased in
most countries over the sample period, the increase in government spending is partly
debt-nanced and partly decit-nanced.
3 Empirical Approach
We measure government purchases by the real change in the government purchases
of goods and services, measured as a share of trend GDP. This variable, denoted
dG, is calculated as the real growth rate of government purchases, multiplied by
government purchases as a share of trend of GDP, in nominal prices, see appendix 6
for details and calculations. The motivation for using this specication is to ensure
that our measure of government purchases is not directly aected by a change in
GDP. Some studies (e.g. Alesina and Ardagna (2009), Duell et al. (2009)) consider
the eect of a change in the ratio of government spending to GDP. This choice
involves the risk that a reduction in GDP caused by, say, an external shock leads
to an increase in the ratio of government purchases to GDP, even if government
purchases is kept constant. Thus, one might erroneously conclude that government
purchases have a negative eect on GDP. For this reason we also use a backward-
looking measure of trend GDP, where the trend real growth is measured as the
moving average of the growth rate over the past ten years. With a two-sided measure
of trend-growth, there would be a risk that the future evolution of GDP aects the
estimated trend-GDP, implying a possibility that the future evolution of GDP aects
the measure of contemporaneous scal policy.
To improve the precision of our estimates, we want to control for other variables
that may aect unemployment. First, we include an indicator for the export markets,
in the form of the cyclical state of the economy of the trading partners. The indicator
is calculated as a weighted average of the GDP-gap of the trading partners, where
the GDP-gap is the deviation of GDP from Hodrick Prescott-trend, divided by the
trend, and the weights reect the share of the exports from country i that goes to
each of the trading partners j. Second, as argued above, we include labour market
institutions. More specically, we include the change in government purchases and
the export market in the unemployment equation derived in Nymoen and Sparrman
(2010), which in accordance with Layard et al. (1991) and Nickell et al. (2005), is
5a function of labour market institutions and shocks. Thus, in our main estimations,
we estimate an equation of the following form
uit =0i + 1uit 1 + 2uit 2 + 3uit 3 + 4Iit 1 + 5Iit 2
+ 6dGt + 7dGt 1 + 8dGt 1 + 9XMt + 10XMt 1 + 11XMt 1 + it
(1)
where uit is unemployment in country i in period t and Iit 1 is a vector of institu-
tional labour market variables like unemployment benets, employment protection
legislation, measures of coordination and centralization of wage setting, etc, see ta-
ble B1 in appendix 7. The dynamic structure follows from the theoretical labour
market framework of Nymoen and Sparrman (2010).
In most of the analysis, we use a Fixed Eects (FE) estimator, allowing for
permanent country-specic dierences in unemployment that are not accounted for
by the other explanatory variables. A random eect model would require that there
is no correlation between the country xed eects and the explanatory variables
in the model. However, this assumption is rejected in a Hausman test, with a p-
value of 1 percent. In principle, the FE estimator is biased when the regression
includes a lagged endogenous variable. However, with a long time dimension of
more than 40 years, this bias is small, cf. Judson and Owen (1999). In addition,
other estimations methods which avoid the sample bias also have their diculties,
cf. Roodman (2009).
The model is estimated on annual frequency, using data from OECD Economic
Outlook, see data appendix. Annual data has the advantage of a allowing a much
longer time span, as very few countries have quarterly data for the scal policy from
the 1960s and 70s. Furthermore, annual data may capture the actual scal decisions
better, as the scal impulses are likely to follow annual budgets, as well as mitigating
possible anticipation eects, see discussion in Beetsma and Giuliodori (2010).
Government purchases have generally increased in real terms, and the unweighted
average in our sample is 0:74 percent, as a share of trend-GDP. The increase was
higher in the 1960s and 70s, when the unweighted average was 1:25 and 1:00 percent,
respectively, while in the latter decades it has varied from 0:52   0:56. There is
however considerable variation within and across countries, with overall standard
deviation of 0:7, see table A1 in the appendix.
The evolution of the change in government purchases and the rate of unemploy-
ment are illustrated in gure 1 and 2. There may seem to be a negative comovement
between these two variables in some countries like Belgium, Canada, Denmark and
New Zealand, but not in others.
4 Empirical results
Estimation of equation (1) resulted in essentially the same coecient value for the
rst dierence and the lagged change in government purchases, while the lagged rst
dierence was not statistically signicant, cf. model 1 in table B1 in appendix 7.
Thus, the two former variables were put together in the regression, and the result is
shown in the rst column of table 1. To focus on the novel variables, the coecients
6Figure 1: The change in government purchases, subtracted country specic mean,
and the unemployment rate during the period 1960 to 2007
7Figure 2: The change in government purchases, subtracted country specic mean,
and the unemployment rate during the period 1960 to 2007
8Table 1: Estimation of equation (1) - Fixed Eects and Instrumental Variables
FEa IVb
Coef. Std p-value Coef. Std p-value
Unemployment previous period 1.28 0.04 0.00 1.27 0.05 0.00
Unemployment two years ago -0.39 0.05 0.00 -0.43 0.07 0.00
Unemployment three years ago -0.01 0.03 0.82 0.01 0.04 0.81
Demand components:
Export market, 1st di. (XMt) -0.53 0.06 0.00 -0.51 0.07 0.00
Export market, prev. period (XMt 1) 0.17 0.07 0.01 0.22 0.08 0.01
Export market, 1st di. prev. period (XMt 1) -0.30 0.07 0.00 -0.28 0.08 0.00
Change govt. purchases (dGt) -0.19 0.04 0.00 -0.50 0.18 0.01
Obs = Country*Average groups 801 20 40.0 626 20 31.3
Standard deviation of residuals 0.65 0.92
2 of all the exogenous variables.c 287.57 (0.00) 210.14 (0.00)
2 of dummy, scal policy and exports.c 195.35 (0.00) 128.26 (0.00)
In all equations it is also controlled for labour market institutions.
a) Estimation method: Fixed eect coecients estimates, standard errors from GLS (xtgls without options).
b) Change govt. purchases (dGt) is treated as endogenous. Instruments are: dGt 1, dGt 2 and debtt 1.
c) Numbers in parenthesis are p-values for the relevant null.
for the labour market institutions are omitted; the complete results are found in
table B1 in appendix 7.
We observe that the change in government purchases has a highly signicant
negative impact on unemployment, the point estimate implying that an increase in
government purchases equal to one percent of GDP reduces unemployment by 0:2
percentage points. The export market variables also have a signicant negative eect
on unemployment. The eect of government purchases is unaected by including
year dummies, cf. model 3i in table B1 in appendix 7. In contrast, the eect of the
export market variables is much smaller with year dummies, suggesting that these
dummies capture common shocks that aect most or all OECD countries. Figure
x in the appendix shows the estimated residuals of model 1 in table 1, and there is
little indication of autocorrelation, even if there is some variation across countries.
Figure 3 shows the eect on unemployment over time from a permanent increase
in government purchases equal to one percent of trend GDP. The maximum impact
of  0:25 percentage points is reached in the second year, then the eect weakens
gradually to be almost negligible after 10 years. This eect is very close to the
ndings in IMF (2010), based on a study of scal consolidations in 15 OECD coun-
tries over the last 30 years. They nd that spending-based decit cuts equal to
one percent of GDP raise the unemployment rate of about 0:2 percentage points.
Monacelli et al. (2010) nd a larger eect on US data; an increase in government
spending equal to one percent of GDP leads to a fall in the rate of unemployment
of 0:6 percentage points after ten quarters. In contrast, Br uckner and Pappa (2010)
nd in an analysis of 10 OECD countries using structural VARs, that a typical es-
timate from the impulse responses implies that a 10 percent increase in government
expenditures increases the unemployment rate at peak (which varies from 3   16
quarters) of around 0:2   0:5 percent.
9Figure 3: The eect of a permanent increase in government purchases, equal to
one percent of GDP, from 2008, based on simulation of equation (1) with estimated
coecients from the FE model in table 1
Table 2: Correlation of government purchases with other variables
Change govt. purchases (dGt)
Correlation p-value Observations
Change govt. purchases, 1st di. prev. period (dGt 1) 0.13 0.00 880.00
Change govt. purchases, two periods ago (dGt 2) 0.32 0.00 880.00
Debt, 1st di. prev. period (debtt 1) -0.26 0.00 677.00
N 1020
4.1 Instrument variable approach
As noted above, the estimated coecient of government purchases will be biased
if government purchases also react to changes in the state of the economy that are
correlated with the rate of unemployment. One way to deal with this problem is
to nd instruments that are uncorrelated with the error term and highly correlated
with the change in government purchases. We use lags for the change in govern-
ment purchases, both lagged rst dierence and two years lag, as well as the lagged
change in public debt as a ratio to GDP. As shown in Table 2, there is a fairly strong
and signicant correlation between the change in government purchases and the in-
strumental variables. Note that while our results imply that the lagged change in
government purchases is correlated with lagged unemployment, the fact that lagged
unemployment is also included in the equation implies that lagged government pur-
chases may well be a valid instrument. We have also tried election year, based on the
idea that governments may pursue an expansionary scal policy in connection with
elections to increase the probability of reelection; see evidence in Shi and Svensson
(2006). However, including election year did not aect the result, and as election
year is potentially endogenous in countries where the government can choose the
time of the election, we decided to leave it out in the presented specication.
10Column 2 in Table 1 shows the results of the instrumental variable estimation.
The point estimate indicates that an increase in government purchases equal to
one percent of GDP reduces unemployment by half a percentage point, i.e. more
than twice the eect from the FE estimates. The eect is also highly statistically
signicant. This may suggest that government purchases is endogenous, leading to
a downward bias in the coecient in the FE result. Note however that a Hausman
test does not indicate that government purchases is endogenous, as the t-value of
the residual variation in this variable is only 0:28. The F-test of the instrument
variables is equal to 9:2, which is at the borderline to a sign of weak instruments.
Because of the diculty of obtaining satisfying instruments, we undertake both FE
and IV estimations below, except for some of the interactions where it is dicult to
nd suitable instruments. However, it suggests some caution in the interpretation
of the results.
4.2 Controlling for omitted variables
The possible weakness of the instruments suggests that we also address the potential
endogeneity of government purchases by other means. The idea behind controlling
for omitted variables is that scal policy might be correlated with the error term
because it is aected by other explanatory variables that also are correlated with
unemployment. For example, scal policy might be pro-cyclical, because in a boom,
tax revenues increase making it possible for politicians to spend more money; this
eect is termed the voracity eect by Tornell and Lane (1999). At the same time,
the increase in tax revenues during the boom might be correlated with a fall in
unemployment. However, in this case including tax revenues as a regressor in the
unemployment equation would lend scal policy uncorrelated with the error term,
removing the bias in the coecient. As the government purchases are typically
decided in the budget process in the fall the year prior to the budget year, it would
be tax revenues for the year when the budget is decided that might aect the budget.
Thus, in table 3 we include the lagged change in tax revenues as a share of trend
GDP to capture that higher revenues might lead to increased government purchases.
In contrast, if the government attempts to use scal policy to stabilize the economy,
one would expect an increase in government purchases in downturns, when GDP
growth is low, or the output gap is negative. To control for this, we also include
GDP growth and the change in the output gap, both lagged, in table 3.
We observe that the eect of government purchases is not aected by including
the additional explanatory variables in model 2 in table 3. 1 This lends considerable
support to the robustness of this eect, as both the lagged GDP growth and the
output gap are variables that are strongly correlated with unemployment. Note
however that some of the export market variables are no longer signicant. This
emphasizes that including lagged GDP growth and lagged output gap entail a strong
test of the explanatory power of the variables.
In model 3 and 4 in table 3, we control for the possible endogeneity of government
purchases in a somewhat dierent way, by also including consensus forecast for
GDP growth, unemployment and the output gap. Again, one might conjecture that
government purchases would respond to such forecasts, and that the correlation
1The sample size is reduced somewhat because of data availability, and the isolated eect of this
- i.e. model 1 on the reduced sample size - is a coecient for government purchases of 0:27. Thus,
the isolated eect of the additional variables is a small reduction in the value of the coecient.
11we nd between government purchases and unemployment is due to both variables
being correlated with the forecasts. However, we see that the change in government
purchases has a signicant negative impact on unemployment even when controlling
for forecasts. The coecient value is slightly smaller, but a comparison with model

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































134.3 Does the eect of government purchases vary over the
cycle?
An important question from a policy perspective is whether the eect of government
purchases varies over the business cycle. We measure the cyclical situation of the
economy by use of the output gap as measured by the OECD, and dened as real
GDP minus trend GDP, divided by trend GDP, and multiplied by 100.
In the rst column in table 4, we extend equation (1) by including the interaction
between the output gap and the change in government purchases. The interaction
term is strongly signicant, with positive sign, implying that an increase in govern-
ment purchases leads to a larger reduction in unemployment in bad times when the
output gap is negative than in good times. The eect of the interaction term is quite
large, with estimated coecient equal to 0:07. This means that if the output gap
is negative and equal to  2 percentage point, an increase in government purchases
equal to one percent of GDP will decrease unemployment by 0:21+0:14 = 0:35 per-
centage points at impact. The result is consistent with Auerbach and Gorodnichenko
(2010), who also nd a larger scal multiplier in recessions than in expansions, using
a regime-switching model on U.S. aggregate data.
The systematic link between the output gap and the eect of government pur-
chases has potentially vast policy interest, in particular for countries where scal
tightening is required. The results in table 4 show that it matters when the scal
tightening takes place, as the same scal tightening has a stronger eect on unem-
ployment in a downturn of the economy. Ceteris paribus, this suggests that scal
tightening should be postponed until the economy is in better shape. Taken at face
value, the result suggests that countercyclical scal policy may reduce the average



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































154.4 Government purchases, debt and openness
A key issue in part of the literature on the eect of scal policy is that the ef-
fect is likely to depend on private sector expectations on future scal policy. For
example, Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) argue that a severe scal contraction might
be expansionary in situations with concern for the risks of high public debt. This
suggests that the eect of government purchases may depend on the level of public
debt. In a recent study using structural VARs on quarterly data for 44 countries,
both advanced and developing countries, Ilzetzki et al. (2010) nd that the scal
multiplier depends on the level of government debt, and that the scal multiplier
is zero in high debt countries. To explore the possible importance of public debt,
we interact the change in government purchases with lagged public debt as a ratio
to GDP (measured as deviation from sample mean, which is equal to 0:6). We also
include debt as a separate explanatory variable, as the levels of debt might well be
correlated with the level of unemployment, cf. Bertola (2010).
The results are shown in model 2 in table 4. Surprisingly, the interaction term
has the opposite sign of the expected, although only marginally signicant, with a
p-value of 7 percent. However, the results reported below suggests that this nding
is due to spurious correlation with time eects.
In table 4, we also explore whether the eect of government purchases depends
on the openness of the country. According to traditional Keynesian analysis, the
government expenditure multiplier is smaller in an open economy. In line with
this, Beetsma and Giuliodori (2010) nd in an analysis of 14 EU countries a clear
positive eect of a rise in government purchases on GDP in \closed economies"
(dened as countries where the ratio of export plus import to GDP is above sample
average), and no signicant eect in the remaining \open economies". Ilzetzki et al.
(2010) also nd a stronger expansionary eect in closed economies than in open. To
analyse the eect of openness, we interact the change in government purchases with
an indicator of openness, based on the ratio of export plus import to GDP. As the
degree of openness has increased over time, we consider two dierent specications
of this indicator. In model 3, the indicator measures the deviation of the export plus
import ratio from the sample mean, implying that the indicator also captures the
increase in openness over time. In model 4, the indicator is measured as deviation
from year mean, thus omitting the change in openness over time. However, the
result is essentially the same in both specications, with a stronger eect in more
open economies, i.e. the opposite of the expected eect. Yet as we shall see below,
this eect does not hold up when we control for monetary regime.
164.5 Does the eect of government purchases vary over time?
In this subsection we investigate whether the eect of government purchases on
unemployment varies over time, by allowing for a dierent eect for each decade.
This exercise entails the added benet that it facilitates comparison of our results
with other studies on shorter sample periods. Model 2 in table 5 shows a striking
dierence. In the 1960s and 70s, we nd essentially no eect of government purchases
on unemployment. In contrast, in the 1980s, 90s, and 2000s, the eect is much
stronger than in the total sample, with coecient estimates varying from  0:27 in
the 2000s to  0:45 in the 1990s.
One might speculate that the absence of any eect in the 1960s reects that
unemployment in almost all countries was very stable and low, not giving much
room for an eect of government purchases. In contrast, in the 1970s, unemployment
rose quite sharply in most countries, and some countries tried to counteract this rise
by use of expansionary scal policy. Thus, there could be a downward bias in the
estimate reecting that the rise in unemployment induced increased government
spending, suggesting the use of IV. However, the IV results in the third model in
table 5 are rather consistent with the FE results; no eect of government purchases
in the 1960s and 70s, and a negative eect for the last three decades, although with
only a p-value of 15 percent in the 1980s. For the 2000s, the IV point estimate is
almost three times as large as the FE estimate.
In model 4, we include government debt in the FE regression, to explore whether
the unexpected sign for the debt-government purchases interaction in table 4 is
related to the fact that the level of debt has varied over time, cf. table A2 in
appendix 6. It turns out that the debt-government purchases interaction loses its
explanatory power, with a coecient value close to zero with a p-value of 0:74.This
suggests that the signicant debt-government purchases interaction in table 4 is
spurious, implying that we do not nd any eect of the debt level on the impact of






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































184.6 Distinguishing between types of government purchases:
investment, wage consumption and non-wage consump-
tion
Both from a theoretical and policy perspective it is of considerable interest to ex-
plore whether the eect of a change in government purchases diers depending of
the type of purchase. In statistical sources, one typically distinguishes between
three categories, which we also use in our analysis: government wage consumption,
which is essentially public employment (dCGW), government non-wage consump-
tion (dCGNW) and government real investments (dIG). In our sample, government
wage consumption constitutes 54 percent of total government purchases, govern-
ment non-wage consumption 29 percent, and government investments 17 percent
(unweighted average across countries). We consider the same form of the left hand
side variable as before, i.e. the change in each of this categories (indicated by the
d in the variable name), in real terms, and measured as share of trend-GDP, see
appendix 6 for a detailed explanation.
The results are presented in table 6. Model 1 shows that government investments
and government wage consumption both have a signicant negative impact on the
unemployment rate (although government investment only with a p-value of 0:08),
while the estimated eect of government non-wage consumption is close to zero and
not statistically signicant.
In model 2 in table 6, we explore whether the eect of the dierent types of
government purchase depends on the cyclical state of the economy. The interac-
tion terms for both government investment and government wage consumption are
positive and statistically signicant, implying that both increased government in-
vestment and increased government wage consumption have a stronger dampening
eect on unemployment when the output gap is negative, consistent with our prior
results.
The third model in table 6 presents the result of model 1 using IV; we nd that
the eect of government investment is much stronger, with a point estimate of -0:59,
and a p-value of 0:05, while the other coecients are not statistically signicant.
Ilzetzki et al. (2010) also explore possible dierences between the eect of gov-
ernment consumption and government investment, and they nd about the same
point estimates for both consumption and investment for advanced countries, with
multiplier estimates (the eect of government purchases on GDP) of 0:4 at impact
and 0:8 in the long run.
19Table 6: Equation (1) with dierent types of government purchases and interaction
with the output gap
Model 1 Model 2 IV 3a
Coef. Std p-value Coef. Std p-value Coef. Std p-value
Unemployment previous period 1.31 0.04 0.00 1.30 0.04 0.00 1.25 0.06 0.00
Unemployment two years ago -0.39 0.06 0.00 -0.43 0.07 0.00 -0.37 0.07 0.00
Unemployment three years ago -0.01 0.04 0.83 0.03 0.04 0.41 -0.04 0.04 0.32
Demand components:
Export market, 1st di. (XMt) -0.52 0.07 0.00 -0.48 0.07 0.00 -0.51 0.08 0.00
Export market, prev. period (XMt 1) 0.26 0.08 0.00 0.24 0.08 0.00 0.19 0.09 0.04
Export market, 1st di. prev. period (XMt 1) -0.33 0.08 0.00 -0.32 0.09 0.00 -0.29 0.10 0.00
Change govt. investments, (dIGt) -0.11 0.06 0.08 -0.13 0.07 0.06 -0.59 0.30 0.05
Change govt. non-wage consumption, (dCGNWt) 0.01 0.01 0.73 0.00 0.02 0.78 -0.01 0.07 0.87
Change govt. wage consumption, (dCGWt) -0.29 0.09 0.00 -0.27 0.09 0.00 -0.25 0.33 0.45
Interaction dGIt and  Yt 0.08 0.03 0.02
Interaction dCGNWt and  Yt 0.01 0.01 0.37
Interaction dCGWt and  Yt 0.14 0.03 0.00
Obs = Country*Average groups 595 16 37.2 537 16 33.6 501 16 31.3
Standard deviation of residuals 0.66 0.64 0.84
2 of all the exogenous variables.b 237.52 (0.00) 244.56 (0.00) 185.35 (0.00)
2 of policy and exports.b 167.66 (0.00) 181.62 (0.00) 101.43 (0.00)
1st order autocorrelationb 1.30 (0.19) 1.39 (0.16)
2nd order autocorrelationb 0.47 (0.64) 0.12 (0.91)
Estimation method: Fixed eect coecients estimate, standard errors from GLS (xtgls without options)
is used in all the regressions except for in model 3 which IV approach is used.
In all equations it is also controlled for labour market institutions.
a) Change govt. purchases (dGt) is treated as endogenous. Instruments are: (dGt 1), (dGt 2) and (debtt 1).
b) Numbers in parenthesis are p-values for the relevant null.
204.7 Government purchases and monetary regime
In this subsection we explore whether the eect of government purchases depends
on the monetary regime, as implied by standard text book macro like the Mundell
Fleming model, and also emphasized in much of the recent literature, e.g. Coenen
et al. (2010). Under an ination target, an expansionary eect of increased govern-
ment purchases will be counteracted by a rise in the interest rate, partly osetting
the eect on unemployment. Also with other types of oating exchange rates, one
would expect an expansionary eect from scal policy be counteracted by changes
in the exchange rate and the interest rate. In contrast, if the nominal interest rate
is unaected, as it will be with a xed exchange rate and for a small country in a
monetary union, and ination increases so that the real interest falls, the govern-
ment multiplier might be considerably above unity. Note however that this eect
depends on private sector expectations. As pointed out by Nakamura and Steinsson
(2011), if one imposes purchasing power parity in the long run, a short run increase
in ination will be compensated by lower ination in later periods, osetting the
eect on the long run real interest rate. Yet to what extent private agents in fact
take such eects into account remains an open empirical question.
We use four dummies to capture the dierent monetary regimes within the sam-
ple period; the Bretton Woods agreement (all currencies were tied to US dollars until
1972), xed exchange rate regimes, oating exchange rate regimes (in recent years
including ination targeting), and membership in the European Monetary Union
(EMU). Countries that took part in the European Exchange Rate Mechanism ERM
are dened as having a xed exchange rate regime, except for Germany, which we de-
ne as oating in light of Germany's dominating position and the independent status
of the Bundesbank. We also tried to distinguish between credible and non-credible
xed exchange rate regimes depending on the interest rate dierential relative to the
anchor country (in most cases Germany), dening the regime as non-credible if the
interest rate dierential exceed 1 percentage point in annual terms. The idea here
is that if the xed exchange rate lacks credibility, a scal expansion could have a
negative eect on the economy by impairing credibility, for example raising devalua-
tion expectations and thus also push up interest rates. However, the point estimates
were essentially the same for credible and non-credible xed exchange rate regimes,































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































22Model 1 in table 7 shows that the eect of government purchases diers sharply
across monetary regimes. The point estimate is  0:35 in the EMU and  0:45
with a xed exchange rate regime, and highly statistically signicant. In contrast,
during the Bretton Woods regimes, and with a oating exchange rate, the point
estimate is essentially zero. The dierence across regimes is statistically signicant
(results available on request) and in line with our theoretical expectations, where
scal policy is eective under a xed exchange rate regime, but not under oat.
The exception is of course the Bretton Woods period; however, this nding only
reects the prior nding of no eect of scal policy during the 1960s and 70s. The
dierence across exchange rate regimes is consistent with those of Ilzetzki et al.
(2010); they nd a signicant positive eect of increased government consumption
on GDP for xed exchange rate regimes, while the eect is signicant and negative
at impact for oating regimes. Model 2 displays the IV results: the eect of scal
policy is signicant under a xed exchange rate, while the other interaction terms
are imprecisely determined.
In model 5, we explore whether the importance of the cyclical situation depends
on the monetary regime. We do this by including an interaction term between the
output gap, a dummy for monetary regime and the change in government purchases.
The interaction term is signicant for three regimes, EMU, xed and oating, which
implies that scal policy has a stronger negative eect on unemployment during a
downturn in all three regimes. The reason why the eect of scal policy is not oset
by monetary policy under oating, could be that in a downturn, the monetary policy
is in any case on the expansionary side, so that it reacts less to variation in scal
policy.
In model 3 and 4, we review our prior ndings on the link between scal policy
and the openness of the economy. We nd that the interaction between openness
and the change in government purchases is no longer signicant. Indeed, for both
specications the point estimate is close to zero, suggesting that our prior ndings on
openness are spurious and caused by a correlation between openness and monetary
regime.
4.8 The eect of labour market institutions
As noted above, there is a large literature documenting the importance of labour
market institutions for unemployment rates. Thus, we want to control for such
institutions. First, as noted we include institutions in all the regressions. This
turns out to be of limited importance, as the eect of scal policy is only slightly
larger in a regression without the labour market institutions (results available on
request). Second, we want to see whether the eect of scal policy depends on
the labour market institutions. The theoretical results are mixed: Ardagna (2007)
nds that an increase in government purchases leads to increased unemployment
in a monopoly union model, while Furlanetto (2011) shows that real wage rigidity
may play an important role to preserve the traditional eect of scal policy in New
Keynesian Models, i.e. that increased purchases leads to higher employment.
To explore the eect of labour market institutions, we rst construct a summary
index on the basis of our regression result. Specically, we detect the estimated eect
of the labour market institutions in column 1 in table 1 by calculating the index as
the product of the estimated coecients and the actual values of the labour market
institutions. We compute the deviation of the index from its sample mean to obtain
23an index with zero mean. We then interact our measure of scal policy with the
index of labour market institutions. The results in Table 9, column 1, shows that an
increase in government purchases has a stronger negative impact on unemployment
in country-years with labour market institutions that induce higher unemployment.
The eect is highly signicant statistically, and numerically rather strong: In Aus-
tralia, labour market institutions are "employment-friendly" with mean index value
 0:77, and the eect on unemployment of an increase in government purchases
equal to one percent of GDP is equal to  0:24 + 0:77  0:41 = 0:08, In contrast,
in Sweden, institutions are more conducive to unemployment with mean index of
0:38, implying that the overall coecient for an increase in government purchases is
 0:24 0:380:41 =  0:40. Thus, scal policy seems to have a stronger impact on
unemployment in countries with adverse labour market institutions. One possible
concern with these results is that may be caused by spurious correlation, as labour
market institutions are generally more rigid in Continental Europe, where we also
nd most of the EMU countries. Thus, in column two, we also include the interac-
tion of scal policy and monetary regime, and we nd that the results still hold -
scal policy has a larger eect with adverse labour market institutions - even if the





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































25Table 9: Equation (1) with dierent types of monetary regime
Model 1 IVa
Coef. Std p-value Coef. Std p-value
Unemployment previous period 1.26 0.03 0.00 1.24 0.03 0.00
Unemployment two years ago -0.38 0.05 0.00 -0.37 0.05 0.00
Unemployment three years ago -0.02 0.03 0.59 -0.02 0.03 0.63
Demand components:
Export market, 1st di. (XMt) -0.51 0.06 0.00 -0.51 0.06 0.00
Export market, prev. period (XMt 1) 0.20 0.07 0.00 0.16 0.07 0.02
Export market, 1st di. prev. period (XMt 1) -0.33 0.07 0.00 -0.31 0.07 0.00
Change govt. purchases, (dGt) -0.24 0.04 0.00
Interaction change govt. purchases and the predicted eect of labour market institutions -0.41 0.08 0.00 -0.28 0.09 0.00
Change govt. purchases (dGt), Bretton woods -0.04 0.08 0.65
Change govt. purchases (dGt) Monetary union (EMU) -0.38 0.11 0.00
Change govt. purchases (dGt), Fixed exchange rate -0.39 0.07 0.00
Change govt. purchases (dGt), Floating exchange rate -0.11 0.06 0.08
Dummy for Bretton woods -0.29 0.14 0.04
Dummy for EMU 0.10 0.15 0.49
Dummy for Fixed exchange rate 0.34 0.12 0.01
Obs = Country*Average groups 801 20 40.0 801 20 40.0
Standard deviation of residuals 0.64 0.63
2 of all the exogenous variables.a 325.66 (0.00) 319.48 (0.00)
2 of policy and exports.a 230.21 (0.00) 231.42 (0.00)
In all equations it is also controlled for labour market institutions.
a) Numbers in parenthesis are p-values for the relevant null.
4.9 Heterogenous eects of government purchases across
countries
The large dierence in the eect of government purchases depending on the mone-
tary regimes raises the question of whether there are systematic dierences across
countries. This is explored in table 10, where model 1 presents the base specication
allowing for country-specic eects of government purchases. We observe that there
is considerable variation, yet the sign is negative for 17 of 20 countries, and the
eect is statistically signicant at the 10 percent level for 8 of 20 countries. There is
a striking link to monetary regime: the seven countries for which the coecient for
government purchases is essentially zero (Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand,
Switzerland, the UK, and the US), all have had a oating exchange rate for most or
all the time since the Bretton Woods. In contrast, for all the countries with a xed
exchange rate regime, the coecient is negative and larger in absolute value.
Model 2 shows that IV estimation for most countries yields the same sign as the
Fixed Eects estimate, even if the coecient usually is larger in absolute value and
the standard error is also larger, rendering the coecient insignicant. However,
there are a few exceptions where the IV estimates are large and positive, but also
here imprecisely determined and insignicantly dierent from zero. Presumably,
the results reect the problem of weak instruments, which is clearly more important
when we allow for country-specic coecients for the eect of government purchases.
In model 3 we address the endogeneity by including possible omitted variables,
and include the lagged growth rate of GDP, the lagged output gap (rst dierence),
and indirect and direct taxes as a share of trend GDP (lagged and rst dierences).


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The great interest of scal policy issues has led to a fast increasing body of research.
Most of the studies are based on structural VARs, or analyze the eects within
structural macro models. As these approaches have their strengths and weaknesses,
it is of value also to try other methods. We investigate the eect of changes in
government purchases on unemployment by use of panel data estimation, building
on an empirical equation where long run unemployment is a function of a num-
ber of labour market variables, along the lines of Layard et al. (2005) and Nickell
et al. (2005). Compared to most of the existing studies, our analysis has two key
advantages. First, our data set is fairly large, covering 20 countries and 47 years.
More importantly, our analysis allows us to explore how the eect dier according
to the circumstances, like monetary regime, cyclical situation of the economy, and
whether the labour market institutions are "employment-friendly". It turns out that
the eect diers strongly with these circumstances, underscoring the importance of
exploring the dierences.
We nd that an increase in government purchases has an economically and sta-
tistically signicant dampening eect on unemployment. According to our base
specication, a permanent increase in government purchases equal to one percent
of GDP on average leads to a reduction in unemployment of 0:2 percentage point,
increasing to 0:25 percentage points after one year, for then to gradually vanish over
the following decade. Instrumental variable estimation suggests that this estimate
is downward biased, and the IV point estimate is a reduction in unemployment of
0:5 percentage point. There is considerable variation in the eect of government
purchases, across time periods and depending on other specic circumstances. We
nd no eect in the 1960s and 70s, and a correspondingly stronger eect in the
1980s, 90s and 2000s. We also nd that the eect is considerably larger in a weak
cyclical situation; when the output gap is equal to minus three percent, the eect
on unemployment is about double of the average eect.
The systematic link between the output gap and the eect of government pur-
chases has potentially vast policy interest. In many countries, the increasing public
debt implies that scal policy has to be tightened before long, so there is little scope
for using scal policy to reduce unemployment. However, taken at face value the
results in table 4 suggest that even a scally neutral countercyclical policy may re-
duce the average unemployment rate over time. According to these results, if the
increase in government purchases in downturns were matched by a decrease of the
same magnitude in booms, the net eect would be a decrease in unemployment.
Admittedly, such an eect would be inconsistent with standard theories of equilib-
rium unemployment. On the other hand, the strong downturn that many OECD
countries experience at present suggests that unemployment may remain above long
run equilibrium levels for a long time, implying that one should not rule out a role
for policy on theoretical grounds.
The monetary regime is important for the eect. In line with the Mundell Flem-
ing model, we nd a strong eect of government purchases on unemployment for
countries within a monetary union or with a xed exchange rate regime (excluding
the Bretton-Woods), and no signicant eect of government purchases for coun-
tries with a oating exchange rate. This nding is consistent with the argument of
among others Coenen et al. (2010), that scal policy has a strong impact on the
economy when the monetary policy does not respond. Considering dierent types
28of government purchases, we only nd a strong signicant eect of government wage
consumption (i.e. public employment), and to some extent also government invest-
ment (with p-value of 5 percent), but not of government non-wage consumption. We
also nd that the scal policy has a stronger eect in countries with labour market
institutions that are conducive to high unemployment.
296 The Data: Denitions and sources
The data are from OECD (2008b) unless otherwise noted. The sample period is from
1960 to 2007, with the following countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway,
New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United
States. The labour market data is also based on the OECD (2008b), but the more
detailed description is given in Sparrman (2010).
6.A Government purchases
The change in government purchases (dG) is measured as the growth rate in real
terms of government purchases, multiplied with government purchases as a share of
trend GDP. . The formula of dG is:
dGit =
(CGVit + IGVit)   (CGVit 1   IGVit 1)
(CGVit 1 + IGVit)





where CG is government consumption, IG government investments, CFKG is con-
sumption of xed capital, and Y CT is trend-GDP. The variables are in nominal
prices, except those where the last letter V indicates real terms. Note that govern-
ment purchases do not include transfers like social security expenditures etc. Note
also that we subtract consumption of xed capital (CFKG) from government con-
sumption to obtain the actual expenditure, as the consumption of scal capital is
an imputed measure. CFKG is not subtracted in the real growth rate for reasons of
data availability, but this is unimportant as there presumably is little variation over
time in the imputed consumption of xed capital. Investment data is missing for
some countries (Spain, Italy, Switzerland) and for these countries we use government
consumption. Trend-GDP is equal to the backward looking 10 year moving average
of real GDP (Y Q) multiplied with the two year moving average of the price dea-
tor (PGDP) to a variable in nominal terms. Real GDP is prolonged backwards
(1950-1960) with the growth rate in GDP in The Conference Board (2010). We
have used the GDPGK series expressed in 1990 U.S. dollars. Germany is prolonged
backwards with the sum of West Germany and East Germany before 1989, and the
data for East Germany is linearly interpolated when observations are missing. The
variable IGV is calculated as IGV = IG=PIG, where PIG is the associated price
deator. The change for the categories of government purchases; dCGW govern-
ment purchases for wage-consumption, dCGNW non-wage-consumption and dIG
investments in xed capital, are calculated by use of the formula above. The vari-
ables in real terms are when necessary (i.e. because they are not supplied by the
OECD) calculated as above; real government wage consumption (CGW=PCGW),
real government non-wage consumption (CGNW=PCGNW) and real gross gov-
ernment investments (IG=PIG), where PCGW; PCGNW; and PIG are the as-
sociated price deators. There was no data available for PCGNW, which was
then calculated from the identity CG = CGW + CGNW, which should also hold
in real terms, CG=PCG = CGW=PCGW + CGNW=PCGNW, or PCGNW =
CGNW=(CG=PCG   CGW=PCGW). Some clearly implausible values for the
growth rate of CGNW were dropped (287 for Spain in 1983, 140 and 34 in United
Kingdom in 1967 and 1970, a fall in the same variable in United Kingdom in 1968
and 1969 of 24 and 27, and nally a fall equal to 20 in Ireland in 1971). Investment
30data is missing for some countries (Spain, Italy, Switzerland) and for these countries
the missing observations are set to zero.
6.B Unemployment rate
The standardized unemployment rate (UNR) in Economic Outlook OECD (2008a)
is used as a primary data source for the unemployment rate in the OECD countries,
and missing observations are replaced by the growth rate in a corresponding time
series in an earlier data base OECD (2002).2 Australia, Denmark, Germany, Spain
and Switzerland are prolonged by the formula in equation (A2):




where Y it denotes (UNR) in OECD (2008a) and Xit denotes the (UNR) in the
earlier data base OECD (2002) for country i in time period t. Australia and Den-
mark are prolonged ve years backwards, Germany from 1991, Spain from 1976 and
Switzerland from 1969.
6.C Output gap
The output gap is dened as the actual GDP less potential GDP, as a share of po-
tential GDP. It is measured in percentage points and collected from OECD (2008b).
6.D Monetary regime
We have constructed 4 dummies to account for changes in the monetary regime
over the sample period; the Bretton Woods agreement (until 1972), a oating ex-
change rate, a xed exchange rate, and membership in the European Monetary
Union (EMU). The dummy Dbretton = 1 indicates the Bretton Woods agreement
covering all countries in the sample in the period 1960 to 1972. In the Bretton
Woods agreement, all currencies were tied to US dollars. The dummy Dfloat in-
dicates that a number of countries adopted a oating exchange rate from 1973:
Australia, Canada, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, Switzerland, United States and
United Kingdom (except 1990 and 1991 3). Germany is dened to have a oating
regime in light of Germany's dominating position European Exchange Rate Mech-
anism ERM, and the independent status of the Bundesbank. Later also Sweden
(since 1992) and Norway (since 1999) adopted a oating exchange rate, with ina-
tion targeting. The dummy Dfixed indicates a xed exchange rate, and this includes
the countries that took part in the ERM, except Germany. We also tried to dis-
tinguish between credible and non-credible xed exchange rate regimes is based on
the interest rate dierential relative to the anchor country (in most cases Germany),
where the regime is dened as non-credible if the interest rate dierential exceed
1 percentage point in annual terms, or if the regime is non-credible in subsequent
years before entry into the monetary union. In other words, a xed exchange rate
2Data are collected and organized by the author. This implies that neither OECD nor any
other source is responsible for the analysis or the interpretation of the data in this paper.
3The UK was a member of the European exchange rate mechanism (ERM) from October 1990
to September 1992
31regime is only dened as credible if the interest rate dierential is less than one per-
cent in all the following years. DEMU indicates EMU membership, covering Austria,
Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain since 1999.
6.E Export market indicator
The export market (XM) indicator is calculated as a weighted average of the GDP-
gap of the trading partners, where the GDP-gap is the deviation of GDP from
Hodrick Prescott-trend (with smoothing parameter 100), and the weights reect the
share of the exports from country i that goes to each of the trading partners j. The
formulae is
XMit = jwijt  GAPjt (A3)
where wijt = xijt=jxijt. xijt is export from country i to county j in year t. GAPjt
is the GDP-gap in country j in year t. The trading partners to one country in the
sample are all the other countries in the sample and the rest of 'the world'. 'The
world' is one country's total export subtracted the sum of exports to all countries
in the sample. The The exports data is from SITC Revision 2 OECD (2010), and
are used to calculate the export shares for each country in the sample. The exports
from Germany includes Eastern Germany since 1991 and as a partner country East-
ern Germany is included the whole sample period. The time series are prolonged
backwards with the exports to the world when observations are missing. For in-
stance if Australia has exported to Canada, but exports are only reported in the
years 2003 and onwards, the exports from Australia to Canada is prolonged back-
wards with the change in Australia's world export growth rate and is equal to the
total export for Australia. The same method is used for extracting the time series
forward. For Belgium the exports data is only reported from 1993. Before 1993 the
data is constructed by prolonging the export data for Belgium by use of the change
in exports for the Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union. The GDP-gap for the
XM indicator is calculated as the deviation of GDP from trend GDP, divided by
trend GDP. Trend GDP derived by use of Hodrick and Prescott (1997) lter, (the
HP lter hereafter). The value of the smoothing parameter has been discussed in
several papers in range of 6:25 up to 400, see Backus and Kehoe (1992), Correia
et al. (1992) and Baxter and King (1999). We would like to remove the dierence
in growth rates from 1960 to 2007, but not remove cycles, irrespective of whether
they are caused by business cycle movements or structural changes in the economy.
Therefore we use a rather high value of the smoothing parameter equal to 100, this
is also in line with Backus and Kehoe (1992). The GDP-gap for each of the twenty
OECD countries is calculated using data from OECD (2008b). The world GDP-
gap is constructed using data for the real GDP in The Conference Board (2010).
We have used the GDPGK-series with are GDP expressed in 1990 U.S. dollars, and
covers 123 countries in the database. The world GDP is the sum of the 123 countries
subtracted the value of GDP in each of the twenty countries in the sample. Note,
that East Germany is linearly interpolated when observations are missing, and Ger-
many is prolonged backwards with the sum of West Germany and East Germany
before 1989. The aggregate of former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Yugoslav
federation and Czechoslovakia is used in the world GDP due to missing observations
for each of the countries separately.
326.F Election year
The election year variable 'elect' is collected from Armingeon et al. (2010), and the
original data source is European Journal of Political Research (Political Data Year-
book, various issues); Mackie and Rose (1991); Keesing's Archive; Parline database.
The variable describes date of election of national parliament (lower house). The
variable covers the years in the period 1960 to 2008.
6.G Debt
The gross government debt variable, as a percent of GDP, 'debt', is collected from
Armingeon et al. (2010), and the original data source is several versions of Oecd
Economic outlook. See details regarding versions and the mission observations in
Codebook by Armingeon et al. (2010). To facilitate the interpretation of the coe-
cients, the variable is rescaled to be the share of GDP. Gross government debt as a
percentage of GDP is shown in table A2.
6.H Openness
The openness variable is total trade (export and imports ) in percentage of GDP.
The variable is collected from Armingeon et al. (2010). See details regarding versions
and the mission observations in Codebook by Armingeon et al. (2010). To facilitate
the interpretation of the coecients, the variable is rescaled to be the share of GDP.
Gross government debt as a percentage of GDP is shown in table A2.
33Table A1: Growth in government purchases - country specic mean and standard
deviation
Country stats 1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-07 1960-07
Australia mean 1.38 0.87 0.87 0.64 0.80 0.90
sd 0.75 0.60 0.57 0.26 0.21 0.55
Austria mean 0.93 0.89 0.23 0.48 0.13 0.53
sd 0.48 0.35 0.24 0.29 0.30 0.46
Belgium mean 1.55 1.36 0.17 0.35 0.43 0.75
sd 0.52 0.40 0.53 0.37 0.29 0.70
Canada mean 1.56 1.16 0.72 0.25 0.82 0.88
sd 0.59 0.70 0.36 0.52 0.20 0.66
Denmark mean . 0.89 0.16 0.54 0.52 0.51
sd . 0.69 0.52 0.45 0.31 0.55
Finland mean 1.31 1.19 0.79 0.20 0.37 0.77
sd 1.07 0.72 0.32 0.85 0.35 0.81
France mean 1.13 0.89 0.80 0.44 0.49 0.72
sd 0.21 0.35 0.24 0.41 0.20 0.38
Germany mean 1.47 1.22 0.19 0.45 0.13 0.68
sd 0.94 0.58 0.51 0.48 0.21 0.78
Ireland mean 1.06 1.59 -0.04 1.11 1.45 1.02
sd 0.57 0.81 1.41 0.50 1.37 1.13
Italy mean 0.88 0.70 0.59 0.04 0.40 0.51
sd 0.15 0.19 0.24 0.37 0.17 0.37
Japan mean 2.17 1.79 0.53 0.73 -0.08 1.03
sd 0.85 1.44 0.47 0.62 0.21 1.14
Netherlands mean 1.12 0.78 0.67 0.65 0.93 0.81
sd 0.37 0.76 0.32 0.24 0.76 0.54
New Zealand mean 0.73 0.97 0.28 0.54 0.93 0.68
sd 1.07 1.49 0.94 1.01 1.14 1.13
Norway mean 1.64 1.56 0.87 1.18 0.90 1.22
sd 0.58 0.45 0.53 0.61 0.53 0.61
Portugal mean . 1.80 0.93 0.94 0.21 0.80
sd . 0.83 0.66 0.61 0.61 0.74
Spain mean 0.49 0.99 0.96 0.79 1.18 0.91
sd 0.18 0.27 0.50 0.46 0.18 0.40
Sweden mean 1.86 1.10 0.50 0.41 0.24 0.80
sd 0.49 0.70 0.31 0.56 0.45 0.76
Switzerland mean 0.37 0.22 0.36 0.10 0.07 0.21
sd 0.13 0.32 0.27 0.24 0.15 0.27
United Kingdom mean 0.70 0.53 0.20 0.30 0.74 0.46
sd 0.75 0.62 0.32 0.39 0.82 0.60
United States mean 1.20 0.12 0.67 0.26 0.44 0.51
sd 0.82 0.43 0.42 0.28 0.23 0.58
Total mean 1.25 1.00 0.52 0.52 0.56 0.74
sd 0.77 0.80 0.61 0.58 0.65 0.73
34Table A2: Public debt for the countries in the panel over the sample period.
Country stats 1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-07 1960-07
Australia mean . . 0.24 0.33 0.19 0.26
sd . . 0.01 0.07 0.03 0.09
Austria mean . 0.23 0.48 0.65 0.70 0.50
sd . 0.07 0.09 0.06 0.04 0.19
Belgium mean . 0.60 1.08 1.31 1.01 1.00
sd . 0.04 0.17 0.07 0.09 0.28
Canada mean 0.61 0.48 0.62 0.93 0.75 0.68
sd 0.06 0.04 0.10 0.08 0.06 0.17
Denmark mean . . 0.66 0.73 0.48 0.63
sd . . 0.10 0.07 0.09 0.14
Finland mean . 0.11 0.17 0.52 0.49 0.34
sd . 0.03 0.02 0.18 0.04 0.20
France mean . 0.33 0.35 0.57 0.70 0.48
sd . 0.04 0.04 0.12 0.04 0.17
Germany mean . 0.22 0.38 0.51 0.65 0.43
sd . 0.05 0.04 0.10 0.04 0.17
Ireland mean . 0.61 0.94 0.80 0.34 0.70
sd . 0.05 0.15 0.16 0.04 0.26
Italy mean 0.37 0.75 0.91 1.18 1.18 0.91
sd 0.03 0.13 0.06 0.13 0.03 0.29
Japan mean . 0.24 0.65 0.87 1.59 0.80
sd . 0.12 0.10 0.22 0.14 0.50
Netherlands mean 0.72 0.56 0.79 0.86 0.59 0.71
sd 0.03 0.05 0.11 0.07 0.04 0.13
New Zealand mean . . . 0.49 0.31 0.39
sd . . . 0.09 0.04 0.11
Norway mean . 0.43 0.34 0.34 0.47 0.39
sd . 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.10 0.08
Portugal mean . . . 0.66 0.69 0.68
sd . . . 0.03 0.04 0.04
Spain mean . . 0.47 0.64 0.55 0.58
sd . . 0.02 0.11 0.08 0.11
Sweden mean . 0.30 0.62 0.74 0.59 0.56
sd . 0.03 0.09 0.13 0.06 0.19
Switzerland mean . . . 0.45 0.54 0.49
sd . . . 0.08 0.04 0.08
United Kingdom mean 0.95 0.58 0.47 0.45 0.44 0.53
sd 0.05 0.08 0.05 0.08 0.03 0.16
United States mean 0.56 0.44 0.52 0.68 0.59 0.56
sd 0.05 0.02 0.08 0.04 0.03 0.09
Total mean 0.62 0.43 0.59 0.69 0.64 0.60
sd 0.16 0.19 0.26 0.27 0.31 0.28
357 Extra
Table B1 presents the complete results of the models in table B1, including the
estimates for the labour market variables. Thus, model 1 is reestimation of the
unrestricted unemployment equation of Nymoen and Sparrman (2010), including
dummies for large outliers. Model 2 includes government purchases and the indi-
cator for the export market, and in model 3, the dummies for large outliers are
omitted, as including them is likely to involve a downward bias in the eect of the
scal policy. For comparison, table B1 also includes two models more, 2i and 3i.
Comparing models 2 and 2i shows the eect of omitting the large outliers, which is a
fairly large increase in the coecient values of government purchases and the export
market. Model 3i extends model 3 by including year dummies. We observe that
the coecients for the export market become much smaller, reecting considerable
co-movement of the export markets for all countries. In contrast, the coecient
for the change in government purchases is not aected, presumably because any






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































37Figure B1: Estimated residuals of model 1 in table 1
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